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ADDRESS
THE LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS
OF THE DEATH PENALTY
The Honorable William W. Wilkins *
A recent national poll found that sixty-five percent of Ameri-
cans favor the death penalty. That's down from eighty percent ten
years ago. Moreover, the total favoring the death penalty dropped
to fifty percent when those polled were asked to assume that the
alternative to the death penalty was life in prison with no chance
of parole. And, the number of death sentences imposed in the
United States during the last few years has dropped to the lowest
level since capital punishment was reinstated thirty years ago.
Thus, it would seem that our society's attitude toward capital
punishment is changing. What was once routine is now excep-
tional, and what was once virtually unquestioned is now ques-
tioned. Along with abortion and the war on terror, capital pun-
ishment implicates not only legal, but social and political issues
as well. We'll be talking about these issues and how our society
has dealt with them in the past, and how it is dealing with them
now.
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. B.A., 1964,
Davidson College,. J.D., 1967, University of South Carolina School of Law. Chief Judge
Wilkins was the Solicitor (chief prosecuting attorney) for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of
South Carolina from 1974 until 1981, when he was appointed to the federal district court
bench by President Ronald Reagan. He was appointed to the Fourth Circuit on June 16,
1986. He served as Chair of the United States Sentencing Commission from 1985 until
1994 and as Chair of the Criminal Law Committee of the Judicial Conference of the
United States from 1999 until 2003. Chief Judge Wilkins has been involved in 96 individ-
ual death penalty cases in either his capacity as an attorney or as a judge.
This article is excerpted from remarks made by Chief Judge Wilkins at the Charleston
School of Law on September 14, 2006, and at the Riley Institute at Furman University on
October 11, 2006.
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Even though I have given considerable thought to what I
should say tonight, I have been at a loss as to finding the right
structure for my remarks. Consequently, I have decided to engage
in a question-and-answer session with you. And, since I am in
control of the podium, at least temporarily, I intend not only to
supply the questions, but the responses as well.
Question: What do proponents of the death penalty
contend it serves?
Those who support the death penalty contend that it serves two
primary purposes: retribution and deterrence. Retribution has
two subcomponents. On one hand, the imposition of the death
penalty allows society to express its moral outrage at the commis-
sion of the most outrageous of offenses: the taking of innocent life.
And, on the other hand, the death penalty is a just punishment in
terms of retribution: an eye for an eye, a life for a life. Taken to-
gether, these two facets of retribution are said to restore social
order, which has been upset by the commission of a terrible
crime.
Proponents also contend that there are two facets to the deter-
rent aspect of the death penalty: not only is the condemned for-
ever incapacitated from murdering again, but potential murder-
ers are dissuaded from committing their crimes by fear of being
executed. We'll talk more about deterrence in a minute.
In the early years of this country, procedures surrounding the
death penalty were specifically intended to achieve the goals of
retribution and deterrence. Executions-which were almost al-
ways by hanging-were public events, many times attended by
large crowds of people. History records that a preacher would
mount the gallows and preach a sermon. One minister noted that
"an execution could be 'a very miserable, but also a very profit-
able spectacle."'
Today, executions take place behind prison walls and are
viewed by only a select few. In most cases, execution is by lethal
injection or electrocution instead of hanging or the gas chamber.
Thus, although executions today are public knowledge, they are
no longer in the public view.
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Question: How has the death penalty evolved over time?
Two significant things have happened over time. First, the
number of crimes for which the death penalty may be given has
been reduced significantly. The list of death-eligible crimes dur-
ing the colonial era seems shockingly long to modern ears. You
will not be surprised when I tell you that, in addition to murder,
serious crimes like treason, rape, burglary, and arson were pun-
ishable by death. The list goes on, however. In Puritan New Eng-
land, a sentence of death could be imposed for adultery, as well as
blasphemy, at least until the late seventeenth century. At one
time, in the South, minor property crimes were capital offenses.
On the Western frontier, horse stealing was a capital offense. To-
day, only the crime of murder has remained a capital offense, and
as we shall see, there are limitations on when even a cold-blooded
murder could carry a sentence of death.
The other thing that happened is that juries, once a defendant
was convicted of a death-eligible crime, were given absolute dis-
cretion to decide whether to impose the death penalty or to sen-
tence the defendant to life imprisonment.
In 1972, the Supreme Court issued the landmark decision in
Furman v. Georgia,1 invalidating every death penalty statute
then in existence in this country. The Court was concerned that
the process for imposing the death penalty was so unstructured
and discretionary that any capital sentence was necessarily arbi-
trary. As Justice Stewart put it, "These death sentences are cruel
and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is
cruel and unusual" because "of all the people convicted of [death
eligible crimes] in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as
these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random
handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been im-
posed."2
To address this situation, many states, including South Caro-
lina, chose to avoid arbitrariness by making the death penalty
mandatory for murder if accompanied by certain aggravating cir-
cumstances, such as burglary, rape, arson, or kidnapping. Other
examples of aggravating circumstances include murder by poison,
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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creation of a risk of death to more than one person, murder of a
law enforcement or judicial officer, or murder of a child younger
than twelve. If a jury found as a fact, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the defendant had committed murder, for example, during
the commission of a burglary, the death penalty was automati-
cally imposed by law. Thus, if two defendants, on separate occa-
sions, committed murder during a burglary, and the state proved
beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of these crimes, both
defendants would be sentenced to death-both would be fed from
the same spoon. The arbitrariness factor that existed because dif-
ferent juries do different things, even when confronted with a
similar set of facts, was completely removed.
However, in 1976, the Supreme Court struck down mandatory
death penalty statutes like South Carolina's. The Court did ap-
prove of a system where the jury had to find the existence of cer-
tain aggravating factors to render the defendant eligible for a
sentence of death, but held that a jury must have the discretion to
impose a life sentence if it chose to do so. And, unless all twelve
jurors voted for the death penalty, a life sentence was statutorily
imposed.
So it seems that we have come full circle, back to a time when
imposition of the death penalty, even though a highly controlled
process, appears to be as random as it ever was.
Question: On whom should the death penalty be imposed?
It has always been the rule that those who are legally insane or
incompetent to stand trial could not be prosecuted for any crime,
including murder. Beyond those two categories, little attention
was paid to the question of whether certain types of otherwise-
eligible defendants should be protected from the death penalty.
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has declared two types of
defendants-the mentally retarded and those aged seventeen and
younger-immune from the death penalty.
1. Mental Retardation
On the morning of October 25, 1979, John Paul Penry entered
the home of Pamela Mosely Carpenter in Livingston, Texas. He
raped her and stabbed her to death with a pair of scissors she had
attempted to use in self-defense. At the time of the offense, Penry
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was twenty years old, but had the mental capacity of a six-year-
old. His IQ was between fifty and sixty-three, in the range of
mental retardation, and he was unable to write his own name. He
was convicted and sentenced to death.
Penry ultimately challenged his sentence before the Supreme
Court, arguing that it was cruel and unusual punishment to exe-
cute a mentally retarded person. In a ruling issued in 1989, the
Supreme Court disagreed. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
noted that the profoundly retarded-those so disabled as to be
unable to understand right and wrong or to assist counsel-would
be protected from the death penalty by the insanity defense and
rules governing competency to stand trial. However, the Court
vacated Penry's death sentence because of faulty instructions
given to the jury by the trial judge.
Seven years after this decision, Daryl Atkins abducted Eric
Nesbitt from a convenience store in northern Virginia. After forc-
ing Nesbitt to withdraw money from an ATM, Atkins took him to
a remote location and shot him to death. Atkins, who was 18 at
the time, had failed the second grade and had been kicked off his
high school football team because he could not consistently tell
right from left. His tested IQ was fifty-nine, in the lowest one per-
cent of the population. He was convicted and sentenced to death.
When Atkins' case reached the Supreme Court in 2002, the
Court again considered the constitutionality of sentencing men-
tally retarded offenders to death. The Court now concluded that
the insanity and competency protections that had been deemed
adequate in Penry3 would no longer suffice:
Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between
right and wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of their
impairments, however ... they have diminished capacities to under-
stand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from
mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning,
to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others ....
[Tihey often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated
plan. 4
The Court determined that in light of these qualities, execution of
the retarded was unconstitutional.
3. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
4. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,318 (2002).
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Ironically, John Penry may benefit from the decision in Atkins.
In the years since the Supreme Court held that he could constitu-
tionally be executed, Penry has had two additional sentencing
trials, both of which have resulted in death sentences. Both of
these sentences have been overturned for procedural reasons. The
most recent of these rulings was handed down on October 5, 2005,
when the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the instructions given
by the trial court in Penry's third capital sentencing hearing did
not adequately account for Atkins, which was handed down dur-
ing the hearing. As of this time, pretrial proceedings are ongoing
for Penry's fourth capital sentencing hearing.
2. Juveniles
At common law, an individual could be held criminally respon-
sible as an adult at the age of fourteen. This extended even to the
ultimate penalty of death: In 1642, in Plymouth Colony, Massa-
chusetts, Thomas Graunger-a young man of sixteen-was led to
the gallows and hanged. Graunger's execution was by no means
unusual-historically, on average a juvenile offender has been
executed every year in this country.
The execution of juveniles-those seventeen years of age and
younger at the time of the commission of murder-has been an
area of particular controversy recently. In 1989, in a case called
Stanford v. Kentucky,5 the Supreme Court held that it was consti-
tutionally permissible to execute a youth who was seventeen
years old when he committed his crime. Kevin Stanford repeat-
edly raped and sodomized the victim during the course of a rob-
bery at a gas station where she worked. He then drove her to a
remote location and killed her because she could identify him. In
reaching its holding, a majority of the Court rejected a compari-
son between imposing capital punishment on juvenile murderers
and laws prohibiting juveniles from drinking alcohol or voting,
reasoning that the kind of broad generalizations about the matur-
ity of all juveniles that are necessary to decide minimum ages for
drinking, driving, and voting simply do not apply to the constitu-
tionally required individual judgment that is required for the im-
position of the death penalty. In the course of its decision, the
Court explicitly refused to consider the practices of other coun-
5. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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tries, noting that "it is American conceptions of decency"6 that are
relevant to Eighth Amendment standards. Thus, were it not for
the Governor of Kentucky's commutation of the death sentence on
the basis of his disagreement with the Supreme Court's decision,
Kevin Stanford would have joined the ranks of the 365 juvenile
offenders who have been executed in America since Thomas
Graunger.
Last year, in Roper v. Simmons,7 the Supreme Court reversed
itself and declared the execution of juvenile offenders to be un-
constitutional. The view expressed by the Court in Roper would
seem to be the polar opposite of its previous statements in Stan-
ford:
The susceptibility of juveniles to immature and irresponsible behav-
ior means their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible
as that of an adult ... [Ilt is less supportable to conclude that even a
heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably
depraved character. From a moral standpoint it would be misguided
to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater
possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be re-
formed.
We have held there are two distinct social purposes served by the
death penalty: "'retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by pro-
spective offenders'". . . Whether viewed as an attempt to express the
community's moral outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for
the wrong to the victim, the case for retribution is not as strong with
a minor as with an adult.
As for deterrence, it is unclear whether the death penalty has a sig-
nificant or even measurable deterrent effect on juveniles .... 8
The Court therefore held that the Eighth Amendment of the
Constitution prohibits the execution of those who were seventeen
years of age or younger when they committed their crimes. The
majority also noted "the stark reality that the United States is
the only country in the world that continues to give official sanc-
tion to the juvenile death penalty" and deemed it proper to "ac-
6. Id. at 369 n.1.
7. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
8. Id. at 570-71 (citation omitted).
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knowledge the overwhelming weight of international opinion
against the juvenile death penalty."9
Justice Scalia, in dissent, criticized the majority opinion at
length, castigating the majority for making a "mockery" of the
justice system. With regard to the majority's conclusions regard-
ing the maturity and judgment of juveniles, he stated that "[i]t is
entirely consistent to believe that young people often act impetu-
ously and lack judgment, but, at the same time, to believe that
those who commit premeditated murder are-at least some-
times-just as culpable as adults." °
Justice Scalia reserved special scorn for the majority's consid-
eration of international views regarding the execution of juve-
niles. If America is to follow the lead of other countries that do
not execute juveniles, Justice Scalia reasoned, then surely we
should also follow those countries in making the death penalty
mandatory for certain crimes or in allowing illegally obtained
evidence to be used against a defendant. He concluded: "To in-
voke alien law when it agrees with one's own thinking, and ignore
it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking but sophistry."
1
The decision in Roper, particularly the Court's reliance on for-
eign law, has evoked a firestorm. For example, Senator Richard
Shelby of Alabama introduced a bill that would make it an im-
peachable offense for a federal judge to place any reliance on "for-
eign law."' 2 It is worth noting here that Justice Scalia opposed
this legislation, saying, "'I'll be darned if I think it's up to Con-
gress to tell [the Supreme Court] how to rule.""' 3
Tom Parker, a justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, pub-
lished an op-ed piece regarding a case from which he was recused
because of his involvement in the prosecution. Justice Parker de-
cried the overturning by his court, on the basis of Roper, the
death sentence of Renaldo Adams, who had been sentenced to
death for raping and murdering a pregnant woman when he was
seventeen. Justice Parker argued that "[t]he proper response to
[the] blatant judicial tyranny" of Roper "would have been for the
9. Id. at 575, 578.
10. Id. at 618 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 627 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12. Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, S. 520, 109th Cong. §§ 201, 302 (2005).
13. Tony Mauro, Scalia Tells Congress to Stay Out of High Court Business, LAW.COM,
May 19, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1147943135671.
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Alabama Supreme Court to decline to follow Roper in the Adams
case. By keeping Adams on death row, our Supreme Court would
have defended both the U.S. Constitution and Alabama law
(thereby upholding their judicial oaths of office)."' 4 Frankly,
many agreed that "there is no magic-and certainly none of the
constitutional variety-in the age 18." 1" Proponents point out
that it certainly makes no difference to the victim and the vic-
tim's family whether, at the time of the murder, the defendant
was 17 years and 11 months old or had celebrated his 18th birth-
day the day before.
Question: Is it possible that innocent people have been executed?
I remember visiting Tombstone, Arizona many years ago. In
Boot Hill, a grave marker reads something like this:
Here lies an innocent man we hung by mistake.
Perhaps one of the most grave accusations against the death
penalty as it is practiced in this country is the claim that innocent
people are convicted and sentenced to die. If true, this is no doubt
a serious indictment of our system. Therefore, we must ask: Is it
true? Are innocent people sentenced to die, and have innocent
people been executed?
Former Illinois Governor George Ryan was sufficiently con-
cerned about this possibility that on January 13, 2003-two days
before he left office-he commuted to life imprisonment the death
sentences of every prisoner on Illinois' death row, a total of 156.
Four other death row inmates were pardoned. Governor Ryan
took these actions because a group of journalism students was
able to establish the actual innocence of death row inmate An-
thony Porter within hours of his scheduled execution, and be-
cause a larger investigation led to the exoneration of twelve other
inmates.
The Death Penalty Information Center states that since 1973,
123 persons who had been sentenced to death have been exoner-
ated, fourteen of them through DNA testing. Many death penalty
14. Tom Parker, Op-Ed., Alabama Justices Surrender to Judicial Activism, BIR-
MINGHAM NEWS, Jan. 1, 2005, at 4B, available at http://www.alliancealert.org/2006/2006
0106.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2007).
15. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Alabama v. Adams, No. 05-1309 (U.S. Mar.
22, 2006).
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opponents point to this figure as evidence that surely, other pris-
oners must have been executed despite their innocence. Others
claim that is not necessarily the case, however. The DPIC defines
"exoneration" as reversal of the conviction followed by acquittal or
dismissal of charges, or an absolute pardon based on new evi-
dence of innocence. In other words, the 123 are individuals whose
claims of innocence were verified through the ordinary proce-
dures attendant to death penalty cases. Proponents of the death
penalty contend that the fact that such convictions are discovered
and remedied is evidence that the system is working, not that it
is broken.
Let me tell you about Ruben Cantu. On the night of November
8, 1984, Juan Moreno and Pedro Gomez were sleeping in a par-
tially built house they were building in San Antonio, Texas. Mo-
reno and Gomez were there to guard against thieves who had
previously stolen a water heater. As they slept on mattresses on
the floor of the empty front room, Moreno was awakened by a
young man who poked him with a .22 rifle. The room was lit by a
75-watt bulb, and Moreno could clearly see the young man and
his accomplice, a younger looking boy. After taking the victims'
watches and money, the young man shot Gomez nine times, kill-
ing him. Moreno was also shot nine times, but survived. He sub-
sequently described his attackers as Latinos wearing blue jeans-
a description that fit virtually every male teenager in the
neighborhood.
Police officers investigating the crime three times showed Mo-
reno a photographic lineup. The first set of pictures did not in-
clude one of Cantu, and Moreno did not identify anybody. Be-
cause of rumors circulating at Cantu's high school, a second photo
lineup that did contain a picture of Cantu was shown to Moreno.
At trial, the detectives who showed him the photographs testified
that Moreno avoided looking at Cantu's picture and seemed
afraid. Finally, several months after the murder, a seasoned bi-
lingual detective showed Moreno a third lineup that again in-
cluded Cantu's photo. This time, Moreno identified Cantu as the
perpetrator.
Cantu was convicted and sentenced to death based on Moreno's
identification of him. No physical evidence tied Cantu to the
crime, and he vigorously protested his innocence. He was exe-
cuted in 1993.
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Since then, the only two people in a position to know what
happened that night-Juan Moreno and the younger perpetrator,
juvenile David Garza-have both publicly stated that Cantu was
wrongly executed. Although Garza, who was fifteen at the time of
the murder, admitted his involvement, he refused to name the
triggerman and did not testify at Cantu's trial. He has now stated
that Cantu was not with him on the night of the murders, but
rather that he was accompanied by another individual, whom he
will not name. Moreno has recanted his identification of Cantu,
saying he was pressured by the police.
Of course, one may legitimately question why Garza and Mo-
reno would only come forward now, many years after the crime.
Garza claims that he adhered to the strict code of silence imposed
by the street gang of which he was a member. Moreno simply
says that he can no longer remain silent with the knowledge that
he helped convict a man with false testimony. On the other hand,
it is not unheard of for witnesses to come forward many years af-
ter a trial and falsely claim that their earlier testimony was not
true.
Question: What are the political implications of the death
penalty?
To put it briefly, the death penalty is a political minefield. In
many states, including South Carolina, most political analysts
agree that it is virtually impossible to be a successful candidate
for statewide public office without being in favor of capital pun-
ishment, lest one be painted as "soft on crime" by an opponent.
Some of you may remember that during the 1988 presidential
campaign, Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis was asked
whether he would support the death penalty if his wife, Kitty,
were raped and murdered. This question gave the candidate
dubbed "the ice man" an opportunity to show a more human face,
and respond with passion in his voice. However, Dukakis' luke-
warm response, in which he reiterated his opposition to the death
penalty and then went on to talk about the war on drugs, signifi-
cantly hurt his chances for a successful campaign. Indeed, some
political analysts point to this answer as the beginning of a slow
but steady decline in his campaign.
The United States's use of capital punishment has earned us
international criticism. There are only three established democ-
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racies in the world where the death penalty may be imposed-
Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Even Russia, with its
bloody history of political executions, effectively abandoned the
death penalty in 1999 under pressure from the Council of Europe.
Turkey has likewise abolished the death penalty. The People's
Republic of China recently announced that in the future, capital
punishment would be exercised with extreme caution. America's
divergence from most of the rest of the developed world on this is-
sue often makes it more difficult to obtain extradition of criminal
suspects. In 2001, for example, the Canadian Supreme Court, rul-
ing on an extradition request from the United States Govern-
ment, unanimously held that it would no longer permit extradi-
tions to the United States in cases where the death penalty could
be imposed. International opposition has affected the United
States' ability to wage its war on terrorism. For example, shortly
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Spain indicated
that it would not extradite suspected al Qaeda members if they
would face the death penalty in the United States.
Question: What is the social impact of the death penalty?
This final question is, perhaps, the most basic of all. In light of
the other questions we have already examined-and in light of
the monetary costs of the penalty-is the death penalty worth it?
Let's start with the costs. There is no question that the death
penalty is an expensive proposition. Studies of how much states
spend on death penalty cases versus life-without-parole cases
range from an additional cost of $2.2 million per case in North
Carolina to $24 million per case in Florida. A recent study in
California indicated that "the California death penalty system
costs taxpayers more than $114 million a year beyond the cost of
simply keeping the convicts locked up for life and not counting
the millions more in court costs needed to prosecute capital
cases. ' ' "C A recent study in Texas revealed that it costs the state
an average of $2.3 million per execution-that's almost three
times the cost of locking someone up in solitary confinement for
life. Across the board-at the trial level, on direct appeal, and in
various collateral review proceedings-capital cases simply cost
16. Rene Tempest, Death Row Often Means a Long Life; California Condemns Many
Murders, But Few Are Ever Executed, Los ANGELES TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at BI.
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more money. Much of the increased cost is up-front, during the
trial phase. Capital defendants, who are almost universally indi-
gent, are entitled to two lawyers at taxpayer expense, instead of
just one in non-capital cases. Added to the defense costs are in-
vestigators and any number of expert witnesses: perhaps a ballis-
tics or fingerprint expert, a mitigation expert to help develop the
defense against the death penalty in the event the trial moves to
the penalty phase, a social worker to interview family members, a
psychiatrist to assess the defendant, and so on. The prosecution
will probably have experts of its own. All of the lawyers in-
volved-defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the judge-will
spend much more time on a capital case than on virtually any
other criminal prosecution. Juries are often sequestered in capital
cases, resulting in additional costs for what may be a lengthy
trial and penalty phase.
The costs do not end when the trial is over, however. A capital
defendant, like all other defendants, will have his case reviewed
on appeal through the state and federal courts. Unlike in other
cases, the government will use taxpayer-generated funds to pay
multiple defense attorneys and experts, in numerous post-
conviction proceedings, to comb the record for mistakes made by
the trial court and previous attorneys. In South Carolina, it takes
an average of twelve years from the date of imposition of the
death penalty to the date of execution, if there is one.
The recent trial of codefendants Brandon Basham and
Chadrick Fulks in the Federal District Court in Columbia re-
sulted in findings of guilty of murder under aggravating circum-
stances and the imposition of death sentences. It was reported to
me by the trial judge that the extra cost to the taxpayers was over
$3 million.
In 1990, Paul Crews of Loris, South Carolina was sentenced to
death for the murder of two hikers on the Appalachian Trail in
Pennsylvania. The Perry County District Attorney recently an-
nounced that he had agreed to move to dismiss the death sen-
tences in exchange for Crews agreeing to drop his appeal and ac-
cept a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. The District
Attorney stated that the county simply could not afford to con-
tinue to fight the case on appeal. And, he stated, if a retrial were
ordered by an appellate court, it would cost the county over a mil-
lion dollars, money the county simply did not have.
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These costs are, in a word, staggering. Is it too much? Could
this money be spent to better purpose-toward education, toward
programs like Head Start, toward a state's share of Medicaid
costs, or reducing property taxes? I'm not saying that it is too
much, but it is a legitimate question to ask.
Opponents of the death penalty argue that there is another
way to impose a just sentence in murder cases where the death
penalty is currently an option-that is, life in prison without the
possibility of parole. Thirty-seven of the thirty-eight states that
have the death penalty now also allow for life without parole.
Some even say that this punishment is worse than the compara-
tive peace of being put to sleep by lethal injection. The solution,
proponents say, is a supermaximum security prison like the one
located in Florence, Colorado. Let's take Zacarias Moussaoui-
after I describe his conditions of incarceration, you decide
whether his sentence of life without parole is actually greater
punishment than being put to sleep by lethal injection.
Moussaoui was charged with being part of the September 11
attacks on this country and eventually pleaded guilty to conspir-
acy to commit acts of terrorism and conspiracy to commit murder.
Because the Government was seeking the death penalty, a pen-
alty trial was held. Although the jury found Moussaoui guilty be-
yond a reasonable doubt of ten aggravating factors, it could not
agree to sentence Moussaoui to death. Consequently, the judge,
as she was required to do, sentenced Moussaoui to life without
the possibility of parole.
Moussaoui has been transported to the Supermax prison facil-
ity in Florence, Colorado. He is housed in solitary confinement in
a concrete cell. He eats in his cell. He has no contact with other
prisoners. Many claim that this total isolation, especially for
someone who wanted to become a martyr, is greater punishment
than being put to death by lethal injection. At sentencing, the
trial judge said to him,
Mr. Moussaoui,... every person in this room when this proceeding
is over will leave this courtroom, and they ... can go outside, . ..
feel the sun,... hear the birds, . . . They can associate with whom
they want.
. . . [Ylou will spend the rest of your life in a Super maximum secu-
rity facility.., it's quite clear who won...
[Vol. 41:793
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... [Ylou came here to be a martyr and to die in a great big bang of
glory, but to paraphrase the poet, T.S. Eliot, instead, you will die
with a whimper.17
And, this is what a family member of a victim of 9/11 said right
after Moussaoui's sentence was imposed:
He will pay dearly. I mean, just think of the loss of the sun in your
life; think of the loss of seeing the stars at night; and only being in
one room for the rest of your life; and not having contact with an-
other human being. He's getting exactly what he deserves. '
8
Of course, the question of cost cannot be fully answered with-
out first considering whether the death penalty "works" in the
sense of deterring crime. There are studies upon studies search-
ing for the answer. Some studies conclude that the death penalty
does act as a deterrent, while other studies conclude that it actu-
ally increases the murder rate due to what the experts have la-
beled the "brutalization effect," that is, the idea that state spon-
sored execution diminishes the value of human life in the eyes of
those prone to violent acts.
Those who contend that the death penalty has no deterrent ef-
fect point to studies comparing the murder rate in neighboring
states with and without the death penalty. For example, in West
Virginia, a non death penalty state, the annual murder rate is
four per 100,000 citizens, while in Virginia, which has one of the
highest execution rates in the nation, the annual murder rate is
six per 100,000 citizens. Of course, there are many factors that
might influence these statistics.
One study I read concluded that every execution both deters
and promotes murders, but the rate of deterrence exceeded the
rate of promotion in the six states in the nation-South Carolina,
Florida, Georgia, Texas, Nevada, and Delaware-that executed a
condemned murderer at least once every other year. In states
that carried out executions with less frequency, the study con-
cluded that promotion of additional murders was greater than the
rate of deterrence.
Who knows? Studies on this issue, taken as a whole, will give
support for any conclusion you wish to draw.
17. Transcript of Sentencing at 13, 21, United States v. Moussaoui, 2006 Extra LEXIS
53, No. 2001-455 (E.D. Va. May 4, 2006).
18. The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (PBS broadcast May 4, 2006).
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The basic problem with answering this question definitively is
that it is not possible to accurately count the number of individu-
als who were not murdered because a would be murderer did a
cost benefit analysis and decided not to murder because he might
have to pay with his own life.
I personally know of one individual who was deterred from
committing murder and robbery because of the death penalty; at
least, he said he was.
The last case I prosecuted as the chief prosecuting attorney for
my circuit in South Carolina was entitled State v. Yates.19 The
facts brought out at trial showed that on the night of February
11, 1981, Dale Robert Yates, Henry Davis, and David Loftis dis-
cussed committing an armed robbery the next day. On the morn-
ing of the 12th, Yates armed himself with a loaded revolver and
Davis with a Bowie knife. Loftis was unarmed. Each time the
three approached a potential victim, Loftis would suggest a rea-
son to look elsewhere-saying there were too many people in the
store or the escape route was no good-until finally he asked
Davis to drive him to a local shopping mall where his girlfriend
worked. As he got out of the car, and before he closed the door, he
leaned in the car and said to Yates and Davis, "If you keep on the
way you are going, you are going to the electric chair, and I'm not
going with you."2"
Well, Yates and Davis did keep on going and in the middle of
the afternoon, they entered a country store in upper Greenville
County. In the store, behind the counter, was the proprietor, Wil-
lie Wood. Yates and Davis pulled their weapons and ordered Mr.
Wood to empty the cash register. After Yates pocketed the money,
they ordered the victim to lean over the counter. I argued to the
jury that the purpose of this order was to allow Davis to kill him
quietly with his Bowie knife. When Mr. Wood backed up, rather
than lean over, Yates fired twice at close range. One bullet
missed; the other shot Mr. Wood in his left hand, which he had
placed over his heart in a defensive action. The force of the bullet
knocked him down and Yates, believing Mr. Wood was dead, ran
from the store and leapt into the getaway car. Davis, however,
saw that Mr. Wood was still alive and began to run around the
counter to finish him off with his Bowie knife.
19. State v. Yates, 310 S.E.2d 805 (S.C. 1982).
20. Brief for Respondents at 5, Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 21 (1988) (No. 86-6060) (citing
Transcript of Record at 820-25, State v. Yates, 310 S.E.2d 805 (S.C. 1982) (No. 21835)).
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All of this time, Mr. Wood's mother was in a small cubicle at
the front of the store, which served as the post office for the small
community she had served as the Post Mistress for many years.
Hearing the two shots, she came out of the enclosed cubicle and
saw Davis charging at her son. She yelled at Davis, who turned
on her, fatally plunging the knife into her heart. By now, Mr.
Wood was able to draw his pistol, which had been strapped to his
left hip under his coat, and he shot Davis six times, killing him.
Yates sped away but was later apprehended.
After convicting Yates of murder while in the commission of
armed robbery, the jury sentenced him to death. How can that be,
you might ask, when Yates did not personally kill anyone? In fact,
when Davis murdered Mrs. Wood, Yates was not even in the
building. Well, I will tell you how. You see, when two or more in-
dividuals combine together to commit an unlawful act, and a
homicide occurs as a probable or natural consequence of the
common design, each member of the group is equally responsible
for the murder-
It matters not who struck the fatal blow, for the hand of one is
the hand of all.
Thank you very much. I have enjoyed being here tonight.
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